Your Questions Answered About Kids, Teens, and Covid Vaccines
Kira Peikoff was the editor-in-chief of Leaps.org from 2017 to 2021. As a journalist, her work has appeared in The New York Times, Newsweek, Nautilus, Popular Mechanics, The New York Academy of Sciences, and other outlets. She is also the author of four suspense novels that explore controversial issues arising from scientific innovation: Living Proof, No Time to Die, Die Again Tomorrow, and Mother Knows Best. Peikoff holds a B.A. in Journalism from New York University and an M.S. in Bioethics from Columbia University. She lives in New Jersey with her husband and two young sons. Follow her on Twitter @KiraPeikoff.
This virtual event convened leading scientific and medical experts to address the public's questions and concerns about Covid-19 vaccines in kids and teens. Highlight video below.
DATE:
Thursday, May 13th, 2021
12:30 p.m. - 1:45 p.m. EDT
Dr. H. Dele Davies, M.D., MHCM
Senior Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and Dean for Graduate Studies at the University of Nebraska Medical (UNMC). He is an internationally recognized expert in pediatric infectious diseases and a leader in community health.
Dr. Emily Oster, Ph.D.
Professor of Economics at Brown University. She is a best-selling author and parenting guru who has pioneered a method of assessing school safety.
Dr. Tina Q. Tan, M.D.
Professor of Pediatrics at the Feinberg School of Medicine, Northwestern University. She has been involved in several vaccine survey studies that examine the awareness, acceptance, barriers and utilization of recommended preventative vaccines.
Dr. Inci Yildirim, M.D., Ph.D., M.Sc.
Associate Professor of Pediatrics (Infectious Disease); Medical Director, Transplant Infectious Diseases at Yale School of Medicine; Associate Professor of Global Health, Yale Institute for Global Health. She is an investigator for the multi-institutional COVID-19 Prevention Network's (CoVPN) Moderna mRNA-1273 clinical trial for children 6 months to 12 years of age.
About the Event Series
This event is the second of a four-part series co-hosted by Leaps.org, the Aspen Institute Science & Society Program, and the Sabin–Aspen Vaccine Science & Policy Group, with generous support from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation and the Howard Hughes Medical Institute.
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Kira Peikoff was the editor-in-chief of Leaps.org from 2017 to 2021. As a journalist, her work has appeared in The New York Times, Newsweek, Nautilus, Popular Mechanics, The New York Academy of Sciences, and other outlets. She is also the author of four suspense novels that explore controversial issues arising from scientific innovation: Living Proof, No Time to Die, Die Again Tomorrow, and Mother Knows Best. Peikoff holds a B.A. in Journalism from New York University and an M.S. in Bioethics from Columbia University. She lives in New Jersey with her husband and two young sons. Follow her on Twitter @KiraPeikoff.
Who’s Responsible If a Scientist’s Work Is Used for Harm?
Are scientists morally responsible for the uses of their work? To some extent, yes. Scientists are responsible for both the uses that they intend with their work and for some of the uses they don't intend. This is because scientists bear the same moral responsibilities that we all bear, and we are all responsible for the ends we intend to help bring about and for some (but not all) of those we don't.
To not think about plausible unintended effects is to be negligent -- and to recognize, but do nothing about, such effects is to be reckless.
It should be obvious that the intended outcomes of our work are within our sphere of moral responsibility. If a scientist intends to help alleviate hunger (by, for example, breeding new drought-resistant crop strains), and they succeed in that goal, they are morally responsible for that success, and we would praise them accordingly. If a scientist intends to produce a new weapon of mass destruction (by, for example, developing a lethal strain of a virus), and they are unfortunately successful, they are morally responsible for that as well, and we would blame them accordingly. Intention matters a great deal, and we are most praised or blamed for what we intend to accomplish with our work.
But we are responsible for more than just the intended outcomes of our choices. We are also responsible for unintended but readily foreseeable uses of our work. This is in part because we are all responsible for thinking not just about what we intend, but also what else might follow from our chosen course of action. In cases where severe and egregious harms are plausible, we should act in ways that strive to prevent such outcomes. To not think about plausible unintended effects is to be negligent -- and to recognize, but do nothing about, such effects is to be reckless. To be negligent or reckless is to be morally irresponsible, and thus blameworthy. Each of us should think beyond what we intend to do, reflecting carefully on what our course of action could entail, and adjusting our choices accordingly.
It is this area, of unintended but readily foreseeable (and plausible) impacts, that often creates the most difficulty for scientists. Many scientists can become so focused on their work (which is often demanding) and so focused on achieving their intended goals, that they fail to stop and think about other possible implications.
Debates over "dual-use" research exemplify these concerns, where harmful potential uses of research might mean the work should not be pursued, or the full publication of results should be curtailed. When researchers perform gain-of-function research, pushing viruses to become more transmissible or more deadly, it is clear how dangerous such work could be in the wrong hands. In these cases, it is not enough to simply claim that such uses were not intended and that it is someone else's job to ensure that the materials remain secure. We know securing infectious materials can be error-prone (recall events at the CDC and the FDA).
In some areas of research, scientists are already worrying about the unintended possible downsides of their work.
Further, securing viral strains does nothing to secure the knowledge that could allow for reproducing the viral strain (particularly when the methodologies and/or genetic sequences are published after the fact, as was the case for H5N1 and horsepox). It is, in fact, the researcher's moral responsibility to be concerned not just about the biosafety controls in their own labs, but also which projects should be pursued (Will the gain in knowledge be worth the possible downsides?) and which results should be published (Will a result make it easier for a malicious actor to deploy a new bioweapon?).
We have not yet had (to my knowledge) a use of gain-of-function research to harm people. If that does happen, those who actually released the virus on the public will be most blameworthy–-intentions do matter. But the scientists who developed the knowledge deployed by the malicious actors may also be held blameworthy, especially if the malicious use was easy to foresee, even if it was not pleasant to think about.
In some areas of research, scientists are already worrying about the unintended possible downsides of their work. Scientists investigating gene drives have thought beyond the immediate desired benefits of their work (e.g. reducing invasive species populations) and considered the possible spread of gene drives to untargeted populations. Modeling the impacts of such possibilities has led some researchers to pull back from particular deployment possibilities. It is precisely such thinking through both the intended and unintended possible outcomes that is needed for responsible work.
The world has gotten too small, too vulnerable for scientists to act as though they are not responsible for the uses of their work, intended or not. They must seek to ensure that, as the recent AAAS Statement on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility demands, their work is done "in the interest of humanity." This requires thinking beyond one's intentions, potentially drawing on the expertise of others, sometimes from other disciplines, to help explore implications. The need for such thinking does not guarantee good outcomes, but it will ensure that we are doing the best we can, and that is what being morally responsible is all about.
This Startup Uses Dust to Fight Sweatshops
"Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." Whoever wrote that famous line probably didn't realize that dust actually contains a secret weapon.
"We have developed the capability to turn dust into data that can be used to trace problems in the supply chain."
Far from being a collection of mere inanimate particles, dust is now recognized as a powerful tool filled with living sensors. Studying those sensors can reveal an object's location history, which can help brands fight unethical manufacturing.
"We have developed the capability to turn dust into data that can be used to trace problems in the supply chain," explains Jessica Green, the CEO of Phylagen, a San-Francisco-based company that she co-founded in 2014.
So how does the technology work?
Dust gathers everywhere—on our bodies, on objects—and that dust contains microbes like bacteria and viruses. Just as we humans have our own unique microbiomes, research has shown that physical locations have their own identifiable patterns of microbes as well. Visiting a place means you may pick up its microbial fingerprint in the dust that settles on you. The DNA of those microbes can later be sequenced in a lab and matched back to the place of origin.
"Your environment is constantly imprinted on you and vice versa," says Justin Gallivan, the director of the Biotechnology Office at DARPA, the research and defense arm of the Pentagon, which is funding Phylagen. "If we have a microbial map of the world," he posits, "can we infer an object's transit history?"
So far, Phylagen has shown that it's possible to identify where a ship came from based on the unique microbial populations it picked up at different naval ports. In another experiment, the sampling technology allowed researchers to determine where a person had walked within 1 kilometer in San Francisco, because of the microbes picked up by their shoes.
Data scientist Roxana Hickey, left, and CEO Jessica Green of Phylagen.
One application of this technology is to help companies that make products abroad. Such companies are very interested in determining exactly where their products are coming from, especially if foreign subcontractors are involved.
"In retail and apparel, often the facilities performing the subcontracting are not up to the same code that the brands require their suppliers to be, so there could be poor working conditions," says Roxana Hickey, a data scientist at Phylagen. "A supplier might use a subcontractor to save on the bottom line, but unethical practices are very damaging to the brand."
Before this technology was developed, brands sometimes faced a challenge figuring out what was going on in their supply chain. But now a product can be tested upon arrival in the States; its microbial signature can theoretically be analyzed and matched against a reference database to help determine if its DNA pattern matches that of the place where the product was purported to have been made.
Phylagen declined to elaborate further about how their process works, such as how they are building a database of reference samples, and how consistent a microbial population remains across a given location.
As the technology grows more robust, though, one could imagine numerous other applications, like in police work and forensics. But today, Phylagen is solely focused on helping commercial entities bring greater transparency to their operations so they can root out unauthorized subcontracting.
Then those unethical suppliers can – shall we say – bite the dust.
Kira Peikoff was the editor-in-chief of Leaps.org from 2017 to 2021. As a journalist, her work has appeared in The New York Times, Newsweek, Nautilus, Popular Mechanics, The New York Academy of Sciences, and other outlets. She is also the author of four suspense novels that explore controversial issues arising from scientific innovation: Living Proof, No Time to Die, Die Again Tomorrow, and Mother Knows Best. Peikoff holds a B.A. in Journalism from New York University and an M.S. in Bioethics from Columbia University. She lives in New Jersey with her husband and two young sons. Follow her on Twitter @KiraPeikoff.